Bear’s end? Wishing won’t make it so
Last week’s rally tempted many to believe that the market has bottomed. Maybe some stocks have hit their lows, but there are many reasons to proceed with caution.

Editorial Statistics

Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules

We analyze how shareholders screen management proposals at annual general meetings. First, we use a simple model of strategic voting to develop a theoretical benchmark of effective information aggregation through voting. Then, we derive testable implications and provide structural estimates of the model parameters. The main conclusions are that shareholders vote strategically and that proposal screening increases value. Shareholders largely neutralize the lock-in effect of supermajority rules, thereby preventing the incorrect rejection of proposals.

Your 5-minute guide to credit scores
A better score means a better deal from landlords, lenders, insurers and other creditors. Use these dozen-plus tips to boost yours.

How to plan for death . . . and taxes
It’s often been said that there are only 2 certainties in life. Here are some steps you can take to make sure death and taxes don’t whack you at the same time.

Recession brings out the scammers
People in dire financial straits are being targeted by swindlers offering loans, mortgage assistance and extra income. Here’s how to tell real rescues from rip-offs.

5 tips: Protect your credit scores now
Credit card companies are slashing credit limits, even for good customers, and that can slam your credit scores. But a few simple steps can help preserve your credit.

7 great jobs for not-quite-retirees
Despite a slow job market, it’s possible to find meaningful work — and the paychecks to keep you from having to dip into a portfolio that needs time to rebound.

Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter

Operating performance and stock return results imply that managers who commit fraud anticipate large stock price declines if they were to report truthfully, which would cause greater losses for managerial stockholdings than for options because of differences in convexity. Fraud firms have significantly greater incentives from unrestricted stockholdings than control firms do, and unrestricted stockholdings are their largest incentive source. Our results emphasize the importance of the shape and vesting status of incentive payoffs in providing incentives to commit fraud. Fraud firms also have characteristics that suggest a lower likelihood of fraud detection, which implies lower expected costs of fraud.